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Abstract 
 
  This paper develops a theoretically consistent behavioral model of farmer decision-
making that allows for analysis of the relative impacts of the determinants of SSI value. The 
model departs from previous literature by assuming that SSI reduces uncertainty, but not 
eliminate it. Due to the complexity of the theoretical model, the impacts of the determinants of 
SSI value cannot easily be derived by hand at the level of general functional forms. A numerical 
simulation model couched in the context of agricultural production is used to evaluate the 
impacts of the determinants of SSI value. Results show that increasing the accuracy (or the “level 
of informativeness”) of SSI, increasing initial wealth, improving management ability to reduce 
uncertainty in the posterior, and increasing the uncertainty in the prior, increases the value of 
SSI. Furthermore, mean input use is found to decrease, as SSI becomes more “informative.” On 
the other hand, the value of SSI is found to be decreasing as relative risk aversion increases. 
These results have policy implications for controlling non-point source pollution from fertilizer 
inputs and SSI-adoption behavior. 
 
Keywords: Site-specific information, value of information, determinants of information value.   2
1. Introduction 
 
Agriculture is rapidly becoming an information-driven industry where an understanding 
of the value of information is important because expenditures on information are becoming more 
significant. There is a need to understand the value of site-specific information (SSI) because 
optimal expenditure on SSI is dependent on the value derived from using it. Obtaining the value 
of SSI, however, is a decidedly complex process because of the various factors that might affect 
an individual decision-maker’s choice of optimal actions, based on the SSI available. Therefore, 
there is a need for a sound theoretical understanding of how these factors affect decision-making 
and, ultimately, the value of SSI. Hennessy and Babcock (1998) have already developed a 
theoretical model that shows the potential impacts of SSI on input choice and revenues. 
However, their model is only an initial step in understanding the potential impacts of SSI on 
decision-making and the value of information because they assumed that SSI completely 
eliminates uncertainty. That is, SSI is perfect information. There is still a need to develop a 
model wherein SSI does not perfectly eliminate uncertainty; which this paper will address. 
  Furthermore, the model will provide a structure for assessing the relative impact of 
economic factors that affect decision-making and the value of SSI. Factors that might affect the 
value of SSI have been investigated independently without mention of a unifying framework that 
links them all together. Several studies have shown, for example, that the availability of variable 
rate application technologies increases the value of information (Bullock et al., 1988) and, also, 
increasing accuracy of SSI increases the value of SSI (Swinton and Jones, 1998; Pautsch, 
Babcock and Breidt, 1999). However, there has been no study that used a unifying theory for 
identifying and linking the factors that affect the value of SSI, as well as analyzing its relative 
impacts. This paper will also address this apparent gap in the literature.   3
  This study aims to construct a behaviorally consistent theoretical model of farmer 
decision-making that allows for analysis of the relative impacts of the factors that affect the 
value of SSI, where SSI reduces uncertainty but not eliminate it. This theoretical model provides 
a unifying framework for undertaking an assessment of the relative impacts of the different 
factors that affect the value of SSI.   
  This paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, we construct a two-stage model of 
farmer decision making under uncertainty, when uncertainty is reduced by the use of SSI. 
Section 3 presents the numerical specification of the theoretical model to calculate the value of 
SSI. Discussion and interpretation of the numerical results are presented in section 4. Finally, 
concluding comments are in section 5. 
 
2. A Multi-Stage Decision-theoretic Model of SSI Utilization 
 
  We build upon existing decision-theoretic models under uncertainty and sequential 
decision-making theories (Marschak and Radner, 1972; Antle, 1983; Weaver and Stefanou, 
1984; Laffont, 1993), to construct a behavioral two-stage model of farmer decision-making when 
uncertainty is reduced by the use of SSI.  The main premise of the model is that SSI affects 
farmer beliefs, which in turn affects his input decisions and the value of SSI. The theoretical 
model is based on an expected utility maximization problem where a farmer chooses the optimal 
input choices conditional on the quality and quantity of SSI acquired. SSI is assumed to be 
imperfect information. Hence, SSI is characterized by a conditional probability density function 
f(y | x) over the set of information signals (Y) that defines the probability that the signal y will be 
sent for each uncertain state of nature x˛ X. This assumes that SSI does not fully predict the state 
of nature that will be realized.   
   4
2.1 Notation and Model Components 
  The notation and basic components of the model are discussed here, before the 
presentation of the model proper. The first component of the model is the uncertain states of 
nature, x, that the farmer is interested in knowing more about, to improve his decision-making. In 
the context of agricultural production, a farmer is primarily interested in knowing more about the 
uncertainty with regards to the spatial distribution of the status of his crop's performance. This is 
the uncertain aspect of interest because a measure that shows the distribution of crop 
performance will allow him to infer precisely the amount of inputs the crop needs, due to the 
knowledge of crop condition, and what part of the field needs more or less inputs. The "status of 
crop performance" at a particular point in the field and at a particular instant in time, may be 
defined as the relative condition of the plant in terms of producing a good quality output at 
harvest. This study assumes that a Crop Development Index (CDI) can adequately characterize 
the status of a particular plant's performance at a particular time and place. The index is assumed 
to be an aggregation of physical variables that can describe plant performance, which is an 
adequate and conceptually tractable characterization of crop performance. 
With the use of the CDI as a characterization of the status of crop performance, farmers 
in this model are interested in knowing more about the spatial distribution of CDI's within their 
field. CDI is a variable that changes from year to year and also changes from point-to-point 
within a field. Hence, CDI is a random vector with both temporal and spatial dimension. The 
distribution of CDI can be characterized as follows: 
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where 
xn 1
mis a column vector representing the mean CDI at n points of the field, and S
nxn
is a 
variance-covariance matrix which embodies the spatial variance and spatial correlation of CDI at 
n points of the field. Assume that S
nxn
= W ￿ s where s is a scalar representing the uncertain spatial 
variance and W is a constant covariance matrix that measures spatial correlation. The mean and 
variance parameters are uncertain because of the year-to-year variations caused by weather 
shocks. Note that, in the context of production agriculture, farmers are primarily interested in 
knowing more about both the mean at n points of the field and degree of variability of crop 
performance, rather than spatial correlation. Hence, the different combinations of the mean and 
variance parameters are the random variable of interest, which characterize the spatial 
distribution of CDI. Furthermore, assume that the different combinations of 
xn 1
m and s is a 
discrete set of alternative combinations over which the farmer has complete ordering from worst 
to best. For example, the worse combination can be one with low means and high variability and 
the best combination can be one with high means and low variability. 
Let the different combinations of mean and variance parameters be represented by x. That 




. The set X can then be defined as a set that contains 
different combinations of mean and variance parameters as its elements. Each x is a combination 
of mean and variance parameters associated with a spatial distribution of CDI, wherein the 
farmer can completely order alternative sets. The spatial distribution is in itself uncertain and 
random because CDI also varies from year to year. Hence, the mean and variance parameter that 
characterizes the spatial distribution is also uncertain and random. The combinations of mean 
and variance parameters in this model also acts as a random variable. Hence, the distribution of x 
can be thought of as a distribution of parameters expressed as x ~ p(y,z), where y is a vector of   6
parameters and z is a management ability parameter. Therefore, the vector of parameters, y, that 
characterize the distribution of the combinations of mean and variance parameters are called 
"hyperparameters" (Lindley and Smith, 1972). That is, the parameters that characterize the 
distribution of x are parameters of a distribution of combinations of mean and variance 
parameters. The hyperparameters therefore affects both the mean and variance of CDI. 
Consequently, the probability density function (PDF) of x is defined by p(x;y, z). This PDF is 
commonly called the prior distribution.  
Note also that a management parameter z was explicitly represented in the prior 
distribution. This representation of the prior distribution of the mean and variance of CDIs 
emphasizes the importance of the "indirect" effect of management ability in influencing the 
farmer's beliefs about the mean and variability of crop performance. Hence, farmers' prior beliefs 
about the distribution of variance parameters depend on his management ability, which is 
assumed to be observable in this theoretical model.  The management ability of a farmer, which 
is mainly conditioned upon his farming experience and education, fundamentally affects how he 
views the distribution of the means and variability of crop performance.  
  Now the definition of information signals that gives information about the uncertain 
states of nature need to be defined. Note that SSI gives an information signal about the uncertain 
random variable x, which we are interested in knowing more about because it affects our final 
output and final payoff. Thus, information signal, y, from SSI is an observable random variable 
correlated with the uncertain states of nature, which in turn gives a better view of the 
unobservable and uncertain states of nature. SSI gives signals that provide a better, but not 
perfect, description of the spatial allocation of the state of crop performance. SSI gives a spatial 
view of important agronomic and soil characteristics that is correlated with the uncertain state of   7
spatial crop performance. In particular, SSI gives information about the crop performance 
through its correlation with the soil characteristics. Furthermore, the signals coming from a 
particular SSI structure, such as yield monitor data and/or soil test results, are generated by a 
random process itself. Stochastic factors, such as weather, may affect the distribution of signals 
based on a particular information structure used, making these information signals random.  
Let A be the set of alternative actions, a, that the farmer can take based on the available 
information. In the context of precision farming, this set describes the alternative ways that the 
farmer can apply his inputs. We assume that the action set has discretely countable elements. The 
set of alternative actions defines the relative flexibility of individual farmers. Flexibility is 
increased when at least one action is added from the set A while deleting none. 
  Another critical component of the decision-theoretic model is the payoff function w, 
which may be described as the profit function of the farmer. The payoff function in this case is 
the functional relation that maps action-state pairs into monetary outcomes or profits. Further, 
the payoff is also "directly" dependent on the management ability of the farmer. Thus, the payoff 
function can be written as w(x, a;z). Hence the payoff of farmers depends on the states of the 
CDI spatial distribution, as well as the input application action taken by the farmer and an 
observable management ability parameter. Note, however, that the action taken by the individual 
decision-maker depends on the set of alternative information signals, Y, available to him. Hence, 
there exists a functional relation between the action that the farmer is going to take and the 
information signal he receives, defined as a=a(y). The decision function a determines the 
optimal action in response to a particular information signal.   
Given that there is a functional relation between A and Y, the payoff function of a farmer 
using a SSI system can be rewritten as follows:   8
          ] ); ( , [ ) ; , ( z a w z w y x a x = .      (1) 
Therefore, the payoff w depends on the states of spatial variability, the decision function, a 
management parameter, and the information structure that generates the signal y. For the case of 
agricultural production with SSI use, the payoff function can be further specified as follows: 
        ka a x pf a x - = ) ; , ( ) , ( z w .      (2) 
The function f(.) can be defined as the yield response function that is determined by the realized 
combination of spatial mean and variability of CDI (x), the action (a) chosen, a management 
ability parameter (z), and implicitly by the information structure used. Moreover, the parameters 
p and k are the output price and the input price associated with the chosen action.  
Note that management ability is an observable parameter in this model such that higher 
levels of management ability lead to a higher output. Further, the presence of the management 
ability parameter in the production function represents its "direct" effect on his payoffs, and 
ultimately his utility. Recall that the management ability parameter, z, also influences the 
farmers' beliefs about the state of nature. Hence, this represents the "indirect" effect of 
management on the farmers' output. These distinct effects entailed the inclusion of the 
management ability parameter in both the payoff function and prior distribution, separately.  
Final wealth, which is the sum of initial wealth and payoff, then determines the utility, 
U[ 0 w + w(x,a;z)], that is derived by the farmer for a particular decision function he chooses. By 
the successive application of the payoff and utility function and letting the final wealth be 
defined as r =  0 w + w(x,a;z), we can simplify the expression above to: 
) , ; , ( )] ; , ( [ ) ( 0 0 z w n z w w a x a x U r V = + = .      (3)   9
The expression  ) (r V is a combined expression of the farmer’s preferences (as defined by the 
utility function) and the payoff (or profit) as determined by his action, management ability, and 
the states of nature.  
2.2 The Theoretical Model: An Expected Utility Maximization Approach 
Given the components of the model discussed above, the model proper can now be 
presented using an expected utility maximization framework. First, assume that there are two 
stages of production within a one-season production process. SSI is collected only in the first 
stage of production and then utilized to make input decisions in both stages. For example, 
assume that before the beginning of the first stage, yield monitor information and soil test data is 
collected. Then the farmer decides how that information could be used in making decisions at 
different stages during the season's production process. The information collected in the first 
stage and the realized input choices in the first stage is utilized at the beginning of the second 
stage in order to make an optimal input choice in stage two. At the end of the second stage the 
output is realized and final utility from production is also realized. Moreover, assume that the 
farmer knows that the decisions or input choices made in the first stage affects the optimal choice 
to be made in stage two. Note that there are no other information collected at the beginning of 
the second stage of production, hence SSI is not updated in this stage. Only the sequential 
dependence of input choices is assumed in this multi-stage decision process.  
In stage 1,the SSI structure is characterized by the CDF f(y|x, q), where the information 
signal  q y is gathered in the beginning of the first stage and utilized in both stages of production. 
This is an information structure with noise, because it does not perfectly describe the set of states 
of nature that might be realized. Hence, the SSI structure could be likened to an imperfect 
prediction mechanism where CDI predictions based on the site-specific soil characteristics do not   10 
always correspond to the actual CDI on the field. Only the CDF f(.|.) characterize the imperfect 
mechanism where a particular  ) | ( i x y f q is the probability with which the SSI signal  q y  
represents the true state of CDI distribution  i x . 
  To introduce the possibility of variable levels of information that the farmer can collect, 
assume that the farmer can choose to observe any one of an infinite number information signals, 
) , ( } { ¥ ˛ o y q q , each of which is correlated with x. The parameter q is interpreted here as the "level 
of informativeness" conveyed by observing an information signal  q y . The statistical concept of 
Blackwell sufficiency is then used to assure that “level of informativeness” increases with q 
(Blackwell, 1953; Marschak and Andrews, 1972). Based on the parameter q, it is assumed that 
the information signal  q y  is a sufficient statistic for  ' q y  when q' > q'. That is, the signal q y gives 
the same or better information about the uncertain distribution of CDI, x, as compared to ' q y . 
Thus, the Blackwell condition is invoked here where  ' q y  has an additional layer of randomness 
in the information it conveys about x. This additional layer of randomness is characterized by the 
garbling condition in the Blackwell theorem. The parameters q and q' can be thought of as two 
different information structures that generate signals of different amounts and accuracy. This 
parameterization makes it possible to describe the farmer's options when the information 
available is continuously varying in accuracy.  
  Since additional information that is more accurate is usually more expensive, assume that 
the information gathering mechanism to receive the signal  q y costs more than the mechanism 
that conveys  ' q y , if q' >  ' q . Furthermore, assume that q is the non-negative price of a "unit" of 
information and that the cost of q units of information obtained by observing the signal  q y  is qq.   11 
The “unit” of information expressed here corresponds to the “level of informativeness” of a 
particular information structure. 
If the SSI structure is characterized by f(y|x, q), the observed signal is y (i.e.  q y =y) and 
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Note that the hyperparameters of the prior distribution, y, have been suppressed in the 
expression above and in the proceeding discussion to avoid unnecessary notational clutter. 
  The first stage expected utility maximization problem, when SSI is utilized to update the 
farmer's beliefs about the state of crop development, can then be specified as follows: 









q dx y x a a x x Max q z q p z w n .     (6) 
The superscripts represent the stage for which the action or state of nature is associated with. The 
subscript g represents a guess of the realization of the state of nature or action in the proceeding 
stage. Note that the farmer's guesses of second stage state and action is a function of the first 
stage state and action variables. The first order condition for (6) can then be represented by an 
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.    (7)   
This first order condition is different from the standard first-order condition in a single stage 
model due to the presence of indirect effects of current input choice on future input choices and 
future states of nature. This indirect effect arises because input use in stage 1 affects the crop 
state and therefore affects the optimal action in future stages. Assume that the optimal action 
arising from the first-order condition above is  ) , (
* 1 q y a . 
  After the first stage state and action variables have been realized, these variables will 
become parameters that affect the optimal input choice in the second stage. Let the realized first 
stage state and action be represented by 
* 1 x and 
* 1 a , respectively. The second stage maximization 
problem to determine the optimal action is represented by: 





2 * 1 2 * 1 ) ; , | ( ) , ; , , , (
X
a
dx y x a a x x Max z q p z w n .    (8) 
Note that (8) does not include a second term for the cost of information collected because it is 
assumed that there are no information collection done in the second period. Since (8) is the 
terminal stage, there are no indirect effects in the first-order condition, which is analogous to the 
case where there are no sequential decisions. Thus, the first order condition sets the expected 
conditional marginal utility in the second stage equal to zero. The optimal solution for (8) can be 
represented as  ) , (
* 2 q y a . 
  The optimal actions in both stages crucially depend on the particular realization of the 
information signal derived from SSI. To determine the optimal information to collect before 
these actions are realized, an ex ante expected utility maximization must be undertaken. The   13 
conditional expected utility derived from the information structure with signals  q y , before 
deciding on input levels in both stages, can be written as: 
￿ ￿ + =
Y X
g g dy y g dx y x a a x x q H
1
) | ( ) ; , | ( ] , ; , , , [ ) ; (
1 1
0
2 * 1 2 1 q z q p z w n q  
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* 2 * 1 2 * 1 q q z q p z w n .  (9) 
The information demand equation can then be characterized based on the maximization of (9): 
          ) ; ( max ) ( q H Arg q I q
q
= .        (10) 
More explicitly, the information demand equation is embedded in the first-order condition 
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Equation (11) shows that information demand is where the conditional expected marginal benefit 
from using SSI in both stages of production is equal to the marginal cost of gathering SSI at the 
beginning of the production process. Note, that the first term on the left-hand side of (11) 
considers the indirect effects of the first stage input choice on the second stage state and action 
variables. This implies that the sequential dependence of actions is an important determinant of 
optimal information demand and optimal input choice in both stages of production. This is the 
factor not considered in the traditional "one stage" decision-theoretic models of information. 
  The ex ante expected utility from SSI could then be used as a basis for computing the 
value of SSI. The decision-theoretic information economics literature suggest that information 
value is the difference between the ex ante expected utility from production when a particular   14 
information structure is utilized and the ex ante expected utility from production when 
information is not utilized. Hence, the following expression can be used as a measure for valuing 
SSI within a multi-stage model (
i
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where  ) ; ( q H
i i q is the ex ante expected utility derived from using an information structure I, and 
￿
X
dx x a x ) ; ( ) , ; * , ( 0
0 z p z w n  is the ex ante expected utility when information is not utilized. 
  The theoretical model above suggests several key economic parameters that may affect 
the value of SSI. These economic parameters are: the technology parameters, risk preference 
parameters, the set of feasible input decisions, reduction in the degree of uncertainty in the 
posterior through improved management ability, reduction in the degree of uncertainty in the 
prior, and the “level of informativeness” of the SSI used (characterized by the distribution of 
signals from SSI). Among these key determinants of the value of SSI, in the next sections we 
derive the impact of changes in risk preference (through changes in risk aversion and initial 
wealth), reduction in the degree of uncertainty in the posterior through improved management 
ability, reduction in the degree of uncertainty in the prior, and the “level of informativeness” of 
SSI on the value of SSI. 
 
3. Comparative Statics: A Numerical Simulation Approach 
 
  Given the complexity of the expected utility maximization problem above, analytical 
results cannot easily be derived by hand, using ordinary comparative static procedures. Hence, 
the relative direction of impact of the economic parameters of the model cannot easily be 
determined at the level of general functional forms. Furthermore, the decision-theoretic literature 
admits to the fact that there may be no obvious comparative statics result at the level of general   15 
functional forms for certain economic parameters (Hilton, 1981). For example, there is no 
monotonic relationship between risk aversion and the value of information that is generalizable 
to all functional forms. This indicates that it may be best to proceed in the context of using fully 
specified functional forms. A numerical simulation model, couched in the context of SSI 
utilization in agriculture, must be constructed using the model above as blueprint for the 
simulation. The general functions above must be completely specified, so that analytical results 
can be generated. 
  The first component that needs to be specified is the yield response function. We chose 
the yield response function estimated by Thomas and Bontems (1998) for the simulation model. 
The special consideration in choosing this function was the fact that their response function was 
sequential and the estimation of parameters accounted for this behavioral assumption. The 
quadratic yield response function estimated by Thomas and Bontems (1998) for Midwest farmers 
is as follows: 
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where: y  = yield (bu/acre),  0 x = preplant N uptake (lbs/acre) and  1 x = sidedress N uptake 
(lbs/acre). Note that the explanatory variables in this response function are nitrogen uptake by 
the plant, not actual N applied. This seems to be non-standard since the explanatory variables in 
a response function are usually input levels applied, but here it is justified on agronomic grounds 
(Thomas and Bontems, 1998). A quadratic functional form makes the simulation model 
operationally tractable. 
  Based on this yield response function, the profit function and final wealth can be defined 
as:   16 
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where p is the input price,  0 w is the input price of preplant N, and  1 w  is the price of side dress N. 
Th output price is assumed to be p = 2.20 $/bushel and the output prices are assumed to be  0 w = 
1 w  =  0.25 $/lb. (Illinois Agricultural Statistics, 1999). Final wealth can then be defined as: 
) , ( 1 0 x x w wf i p + = , where  i w  is the initial wealth. Initial wealth is assumed to be $1,000. This 
value was chosen because we want the initial wealth to have a similar magnitude to potential 
profits, in order to get adequate responses in the comparative statics. For example, initial wealth 
with higher magnitudes may result in non-responsiveness of SSI value to changes in risk 
attitudes.   
  The next component that needs to be specified is the utility function. This study will use 
the popular power utility function: 




U = ) ; (  ,        (14) 
where wf is final wealth and f is the single risk preference parameter. The power utility function 
exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). 
The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion A(p) is given by the expression 
p
f) 1 ( -
, 
which is decreasing in profits/wealth. The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion R(p), 
therefore, is represented by (1-f), which is constant regardless of profit/wealth. The base CRRA 
in the simulation is assumed to be 1-f  =  2.0. The restriction of risk preference to DARA is 
justifiable because it is consistent with the behavioral postulate that as profit/wealth increases 
risk aversion decreases. Furthermore, a number of empirical studies have found evidence that 
supports the presence of DARA behavior among economic agents, in general, and farmers, in   17 
particular (Lins, Gabriel, and Sonka, 1981; Saha, Shumway and Talpaz, 1994; and Chavas and 
Holt, 1996). 
  The uncertainty in the model (or the shocks) is the next component that needs to be 
specified. For computational tractability, we assume that the shocks are discrete random 
variables and, hence, have discrete probability distributions. Let there be two shocks in the 
model. One is weather-related shock ( 1 e ), and another is a shock due to the uncertain spatial 
mean and variability of crop performance ( 2 e ). The weather-related shock is derived from a beta 
distribution with parameters á = 3 and â = 3 (i.e.,  1 e ~ Beta (3,3)). The prior distribution of 
beliefs about the crop performance-related shock is also derived from a beta distribution with 
parameters á = 3 and â = 3 (i.e.,  2 e ~ Beta (3,3)). This is the case where no new information is 
used to update beliefs about  2 e . A random number generator and frequency count algorithm was 
used to derive a discrete probability distribution based on the Beta distributions. Furthermore, 
assume that uncertainty about 1 e affects both stages, while uncertainty about 2 e  is only considered 
in the first stage.  
  To operationalize a sequential model, the relationship between  1 x  and  0 x  should be 
determined. This is done by getting the partial derivative of the yield response function with 
respect to  1 x  and setting it equal to zero, to solve for 1 x . This yields an equation where  1 x  is a 
function of  0 x . This equation is then plugged into the profit function above to yield a “new” 
profit function, which is only a function of  0 x . This  “new” profit function is then used to find 
the optimal preplant N ( 0 x ). This is the first stage of the sequential model where  0 x  is chosen 
and consequently  2 e  is realized. The optimal preplant N solved above must then be fed into the 
second stage expected utility maximization procedure to solve for the optimal sidedress N ( 1 x ).   18 
Note that the crop performance-related shock has been realized and thus uncertainty in the 
second stage pertains to the weather-related shock. 
  The solution to the model specified above is the case where SSI is not used to update 
beliefs about the crop performance-related shock ( 2 e ). Updating beliefs through SSI is done 
through the Bayesian updating formula discussed in the previous section.  This is done by 
defining the distribution  ) | ( i x y f q ,  which represents the “level of informativeness” of a 
particular information structure. We define three information structures with decreasing degree 
of informativeness. A priori, we interpreted the most informative structure as SSI coming from 
both yield monitor data and soil test information, the next less informative structure is from soil 
test only, and the least informative structure is from yield monitor data only. The most 
informative structure was first constructed, and then additional layers of noise were added to 
construct the two less informative structures. Markov matrices representing Blackwell’s garbling 
condition are constructed to add the additional layers of noise.  
  Once SSI is utilized to update the prior beliefs about the crop performance-related shock, 
the sequential model is run again to find the optimal preplant and sidedress N. This will then 
enable computation of the value of SSI and derivation of numerical comparative static results. 
The comparative statics are undertaken by marginally changing the original parameter values 
above and looking at the direction of change in the input levels and the value of SSI. For 
example, to find impact of increasing risk aversion, the risk aversion parameter in the simulation 
model is marginally increased and then the value of SSI is compared to the initial numerical 
estimate from the original model. If the value of SSI increases, then we can say that there is a 
positive relationship between risk aversion and the value of SSI. 
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4. Numerical Results and Discussion 
 
  The numerical comparative static results are presented in Tables 1 to 5. The first 
economic parameter investigated is the effect of increasing the “level of informativeness” of SSI 
(Table 1). The numerical model indicates that there is a positive relationship between the “level 
of informativeness” and the value of SSI. This is consistent with the general theoretical literature 
on decision-making under uncertainty where increasing the level of informativeness through the 
Blackwell criterion increases the value of information (Blackwell, 1953; Hilton, 1981). At the 
level of general functional forms, this is the only parameter with an unambiguous positive 
relationship with the value of information. Furthermore, the comparative static result found here 
is consistent with observations from the agricultural economics literature where the accuracy of 
SSI (or in our case the “informativeness” of SSI) increases the value of SSI (Swinton and Jones, 
1998; Pautsch, Babcock, and Breidt, 1999).     
  Furthermore, Table 1 shows that when SSI is utilized mean input use in both stages 
increase relative to the case where SSI is not utilized. This indicates that as farmers acquire ex 
ante information about the spatial distribution of crop performance they tend to increase input 
use. This comparative static result is consistent with Henessey and Babcock’s (1999) theoretical 
insight that for an additive technology with negative third derivatives, acquisition of SSI that 
eliminates uncertainty increases mean input use. Therefore, our sequential model with additive 
technology show that even if SSI only reduces uncertainty and third derivatives do not exist, 
input use increases when SSI is acquired. However, as the “level of informativeness” of SSI 
increase, the numerical model shows that the optimal preplant N decreases. This suggests that 
mean input use may increase less as the decision-maker acquires better information.   20 
In Table 2, the impact of changes in relative risk aversion is presented. The numerical 
results indicate that the value of SSI and relative risk aversion is inversely related. This result 
seems to be counter-intuitive at first glance because we would expect that a more risk-averse 
individual would value information more than a less risk-averse individual. However, as Hilton 
(1981) has shown, there are no general monotonic relationship between relative risk aversion and 
information value, which makes the result above possible. There are two possible explanations 
for the seemingly counter-intuitive result. First, increasing relative risk aversion implies that the 
individual becomes less inclined to invest in the risky asset -- the fertilizer inputs in this case. 
The individual in essence becomes less responsive to the SSI gathered. This results in lower 
input application levels, as well as lower value of SSI. Second, the distribution of shocks 
specified in the model implies a symmetric profit distribution and SSI utilization only reduces 
the variance of this distribution, not the mean. Risk-averse individuals generally prefer a 
positively skewed distribution, where there is higher probability of upside shock. Since SSI in 
our model only reduces variance, both the lower and upper tails of the profit distribution are 
reduced. The reduction in the upper tail causes a more risk-averse individual to reduce input 
application and value SSI less.   
  The impact of changes in initial wealth on the value of SSI is presented in Table 3. The 
numerical model reveals that initial wealth is positively related to SSI value. This result is 
consistent with the relationship found between risk aversion and the value of SSI. Increasing 
initial wealth is similar to decreasing risk aversion. That is, as wealth increases risk aversion 
decreases. Thus, as initial wealth increases an individual is more willing to invest in the risky 
fertilizer inputs and be more responsive to SSI. This suggests that value of SSI should increase as 
initial wealth increases.     21 
   The numerical simulation model also suggests that as management ability improves, 
such that the degree of uncertainty in the posterior is reduced, the value of SSI also increase 
(Table 5). This may mean that as management ability is improved, SSI is interpreted better and 
its value increases. Any direct reduction in the uncertainty through improved management ability 
and improved information processing will thus increase the value of SSI. Thus, when SSI is 
utilized, any improvement in management ability that further reduces posterior uncertainty will 
increase the value of SSI   
  On the other hand, the numerical model indicates that a reduction in uncertainty in the 
prior distribution will decrease the value of SSI (Table 6). As initial uncertainty about the spatial 
distribution of crop performance is reduced, the value of SSI will decrease. Looking at it from 
the opposite perspective, SSI becomes more valuable as prior uncertainty is increased. If a 
farmer has a very heterogeneous field such that there is a lot of uncertainty about potential crop 
performance in particular parts of the field, then SSI will be more valuable. A farmer with a field 
that is very homogenous and stable across time will not find SSI very beneficial. 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
  This paper has presented a behaviorally consistent theoretical model of farmer decision-
making that allows for analysis of the relative impacts of economic parameters that may affect 
the value of SSI. One of the main contributions of the theoretical model is that it does not assume 
that SSI completely eliminate uncertainty when it is utilized, as is done in previous theoretical 
models of this kind. Furthermore, the model provides a way of analyzing economic factors that 
affect the value of SSI within one unifying structure, rather than separately analyzing the effect 
of each factor. Building upon existing models of decision-making under uncertainty and 
sequential decision models, the model shows that there may be several likely key determinants of   22 
the value of SSI in agriculture: the technology parameters, risk preference parameters, the set of 
feasible input decisions, reduction in the degree of uncertainty in the posterior through improved 
management ability, reduction in the degree of uncertainty in the prior, and the “level of 
informativeness” of the SSI used (characterized by the distribution of signals from SSI). 
  A numerical simulation model is then constructed to derive the relative impacts of some 
of these determinants on the value of SSI. This route was chosen because the decision-theoretic 
literature admits to the fact that there may be no obvious comparative statics result at the level of 
general functional forms for certain economic parameters and because finding analytical results 
by hand is computationally complex (Hilton, 1981). Results show that increasing the accuracy 
(or the “level of informativeness”) of SSI, increasing initial wealth, improving management 
ability to reduce uncertainty in the posterior, and increasing the uncertainty in the prior, increases 
the value of SSI. Furthermore, mean input use is found to decrease, as SSI becomes more 
“informative.” However, the numerical model shows that the value of SSI is negatively related to 
relative risk aversion. A caveat to keep in mind is that these results critically depend on the 
technology specification in the numerical model. A more flexible specification and better 
parameter estimates may give better results. Further research must be undertaken to explore the 
use of alternative functional forms and parameter estimates.      
  There are several potential policy implications of these results. In terms of environmental 
policy, the results suggest that there may be potential returns to further improvement in the 
accuracy of SSI. Since mean input use declines as SSI becomes more “informative,” better 
information may lead to lower fertilizer residuals that may cause non-point source pollution. 
Hence, encouraging adoption of SSI may be seen as an option for policy makers to control non-
point source pollution from nitrogen fertilizers.  The results also have implications for predicting   23 
adoption behavior.  The results indicate that more risk-averse individuals do not necessarily 
value SSI more than less risk-averse individuals. In this case, we cannot expect risk-averse 
farmers to adopt SSI more than less risk-averse farmers. On the other hand, increasing accuracy 
of SSI, increasing initial wealth, and improving management ability increases the benefits of SSI, 
which increases the incentive for utilizing it.  Also, if the farmer’s field is heterogeneous, such 
that initial uncertainty about the field is high, SSI may be more valuable and there is more 
incentive for the farmer to adopt. Thus, wealthy farmers with above average management ability 
and heterogeneous fields may be the ones expected to adopt SSI more.     
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Table 1. The Impact of Increasing the Level of Informativeness of SSI on the Value of SSI (VOI) 
Type of SSI used  Preplant N  Sidedress N  Value of SSI  %Value of SSI* 
         
SSI not utilized  41.061  1.280     
         
SSI is less informative  41.763  1.267  51.09  0.53 
         
SSI is informative  41.762  1.267  71.76  0.75 
         
SSI is more informative  41.755  1.267  74.46  0.77 
         
         
Direction of Impact: Positive (An increase in informativeness of SSI, increases the VOI)   
         
*Note: %Value of SSI is the percentage difference between the expected utility when SSI is used and 
           when SSI is not used.         
         
         
Table 2. The Impact of Increasing Risk-Aversion on the Value of SSI (VOI)   
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion  Preplant N  Sidedress N  Value of SSI  %Value of SSI 
         
CRRA  = 1.8  41.778  1.271  427.00  0.86 
         
CRRA  = 2.0  41.755  1.267  74.46  0.77 
         
CRRA  = 2.2  41.731  1.263  13.33  0.69 
         
         
Direction of Impact: Negative (An increase in the CRRA, decreases the VOI)   
         
*Note: %Value of SSI is the percentage difference between the expected utility when SSI is used and 
           when SSI is not used.         
         
         
Table 3. The Impact of Increasing Intial Wealth on the Value of SSI (VOI)     
Initial Wealth  Preplant N  Sidedress N  Value of SSI  %Value of SSI 
         
W0  = 500  41.582  1.239  72.30  0.43 
         
W0  = 1,000  41.755  1.267  74.46  0.77 
         
W0  = 1,500  41.825  1.278  802.81  13.35 
         
         
Direction of Impact: Positive (An increase in the initial wealth, increases the VOI)   
         
*Note: %Value of SSI is the percentage difference between the expected utility when SSI is used and 
           when SSI is not used.           27 
 
Table 4. The Impact of Improving Management Ability through a Reduction in Posterior Uncertainty. 
(Base Case = Beta (3,3) )         
Distribution of  Shocks  Preplant N  Sidedress N  Value of SSI  %Value of SSI 
         
Beta (4,4)  41.276  1.276  103.80  1.08 
         
Beta (5,5)  41.232  1.277  130.50  1.36 
         
Beta (6,6)  41.202  1.277  168.60  1.76 
         
         
Direction of Impact: Positive (An improvement in management ability, increases the VOI) 
         
*Note: %Value of SSI is the percentage difference between the expected utility when SSI is used and 
           when SSI is not used.         
         
         
Table 5. The Impact of Reducing Uncertainty in the Prior Distribution.      
Distribution of  Shocks  Preplant N  Sidedress N  Value of SSI  %Value of SSI 
         
Beta (3,3)  41.755  1.267  74.460  0.77 
         
Beta (4,4)  41.388  1.274  66.870  0.68 
         
Beta (5,5)  41.364  1.274  58.260  0.60 
         
         
Direction of Impact: Positive (A decrease in uncertainty, decreases the VOI)   
         
*Note: %Value of SSI is the percentage difference between the expected utility when SSI is used and 
           when SSI is not used.         
 
 